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Summary. Equity and neutrality are distinct concepts in housing taxation and weak and strong
tenure neutrality should be distinguished. When a tax system is tested for those criteria, the
taxes paid by landlords must be included, as they affect the rents renters pay. This paper defines
appropriate tests, applies them to a stylised tax system and proposes tax changes designed to
restore tenure equity and/or neutrality. It shows how the homeowner’s implicit income should
be computed for taxes to be fundamentally tenure-neutral or equitable or both. It also shows the
key role played by the cost differential in producing housing services under owner-occupation
and renting.
1. Introduction
The tax advantage to homeowners is tradition-
ally measured by reference with full imputa-
tion of the implicit rent as income for tax
purposes (see for example, Aaron, 1970).
The implicit rent is taken to be the market
rent for an equivalent dwelling, from which
the homeowner should be allowed to deduct
mortgage interest and operating costs. There
are two problems with that approach, one
practical and one conceptual. The practical
problem is estimating the market rent for an
equivalent dwelling, or the rent at which the
homeowner could let his dwelling to a
renter, or the rent a landlord would charge
him for that dwelling. Sometimes national
averages are used to eliminate quality differ-
ences, but the ‘average’ rental apartment is
certainly of lower quality than the ‘average’
owner-occupied housing unit.
The conceptual problem is simply that it is
not clear why the market rent for the dwelling
should be used to measure the homeowner’s
implicit income and even less clear why he
should be taxed on that basis. Feldstein
(1976) challenged that view, so it is necessary
to return first to basic principles of equity and
neutrality of housing taxation. We do so in
this paper, with a view to providing the tools
for setting up a tenure-neutral and equitable
housing tax system.
A related branch of the literature examines
the relative costs of owner-occupied and
rental housing and their impact on tenure
choice (for example, Rosen and Rosen,
1980, Hendershott and Shilling, 1982).
Taxes play an important role in that compari-
son as they constitute a much easier way to
measure difference than management and
maintenance costs. That literature generally
concludes that personal income tax advan-
tages can substantially favour homeownership
(Rosen, 1984), implying that the tax system is
not neutral with respect to tenure choice. In
fact, what that literature shows is that the
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user cost for owner-occupied housing is a
smaller proportion of the dwelling’s price
than the user cost of rental housing. That
might be offset to some extent by a premium
for dwellings sold to owner-occupiers, par-
ticularly when tax advantages are partly
capitalised.
It is not that obvious to draw conclusions
about the non-neutrality of housing taxation
from that literature. Indeed, differences in
user costs mingle differences in tax treatment
and differences in production costs. In
addition, there exists some confusion about
the meaning of neutrality. Tenure neutrality
is generally interpreted as equal costs for
rental and owner-occupied housing, presum-
ably of the same quality (for example,
Englund, 2003). Haffner (2003) provides an
overview of the possible meanings of tenure
neutrality, ranging from equal cash outlays
by renters and homeowners to equal public
spending for either mode. She concludes that
equality of user costs is the appropriate
concept: “if user costs differed between
tenures, they could be equalised, in order to
remove any distortion of consumers’ choice”
(p. 84). In that interpretation, a public policy
seeking tenure neutrality would iron out all
differences in user costs created by housing
and tax policy but also by market forces.
Lundqvist goes even farther
A neutral policy would include legal
measures to make tenures alike in terms
of freedom of disposal and security of
tenure. Systems of housing finance, and
terms of repayment, would be structured
in such a way as to neutralise the impact
of ability to pay on household choice of
tenure (Lundqvist, 1986, p. 16).
Note, however, that Lundqvist does not show
how those concepts could be tested.
Such requirements go too far. They attempt
to make all players equally strong where
levelling the playing-field and letting the
best win is more conducive to efficiency.
Instead, we shall define a tenure-neutral tax
and subsidies system as one that preserves
the ordering of user costs—whichever tenure
is cheaper before tax is still cheaper after
tax. Under certain conditions, a stronger neu-
trality condition might be warranted: a tax
system is strongly neutral if it preserves the
absolute difference in user costs.
Obviously, tenure choice cannot be reduced
to a comparison of user costs (Shelton, 1968),
but it is a component of that choice that public
authorities can influence, mainly through
taxation. Numerous countries encourage
homeownership through tax advantages.
Some European authorities may appear less
generous, as they tax an imputed income for
the homeowner. This contribution will define
the benchmark with which the tax systems
ought to be compared in order to determine
the generosity of tax advantages granted to
homeowners.
User costs depend on particular circum-
stances: the type of landlord, the terms at
which he can borrow funds compared with
the homeowner, the types of dwelling occu-
pied, the length of residence and the holding
period, the timing of purchase and sale over
the real estate cycle, the performance of the
local housing market and so forth. No tax
system can be tenure-neutral under all circum-
stances. Our goal here is to define an income
tax system that is fundamentally tenure-
neutral—i.e. it is tenure-neutral when the
economic differences between the two
tenures are reduced to plain structural
differences.
When tenure neutrality is carefully defined,
it appears that it is not equivalent to tenure
equity. Roughly speaking, and that definition
will be refined, the tax system is equitable
with respect to tenures if it collects more
from households in the cheaper tenure,
because their capacity to contribute is
higher. An equitable tax system might affect
tenure choice and thus not be neutral, by redu-
cing the advantage of the cheaper tenure. On
the other hand, an inequitable tax system
might well be tenure-neutral, by favouring
that tenure which is already more
advantageous.
Public finance analysts are familiar with
testing the equity of an income tax system
for household categories by considering
taxable incomes and deductibles. They
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seldom consider the taxation of commodities,
even when its incidence is higher prices.
Indeed, it is held that these taxes are like con-
sumption taxes, that all households bear them
similarly in proportion of their consumption.
That is not true for housing, the largest item
in most households’ budget. Taxes levied on
the production of rental housing services—
taxes paid by landlords—are not borne by
homeowners. This paper shows that landlord
taxation must be included in the examination
of the tenure equity and neutrality of
housing income taxation, and how to do so.
Section 2 defines those terms and concepts
in greater detail. It will propose to replace
the concept of ‘user cost’ by that of ‘available
income’, which allows addressing both neu-
trality and equity. It also introduces the model-
ling approach with which housing taxation
will be assessed. Actual modelling starts in
section 3, with the minimum mathematics
required to formalise the concepts. It defines
available incomes and arbitrage conditions in
the absence, first, of all taxes. Thus, section 3
provides the tax-free benchmarks against
which the influence of taxation on tenure
choice and its equity will be measured.
Section 4 introduces taxes in their most
general form into user costs and available
income and section 5 defines tenure equity
and neutrality as conditions on those taxes.
Section 6 illustrates the approach on the
basis of a stylised tax system that is similar
to those found in European countries. Section
7 assesses a number of common or possible
housing taxation systems on their tenure
equity and neutrality. Section 8 summarises
the results of that assessment and concludes.
2. Concepts, Terminology and Modelling
Approach
When we consider housing taxation from the
point of view of equity, we define it simply
as the condition that taxes paid reflect capacity
to contribute and we focus on the differen-
tial treatment of renters and homeowners.
Capacity to contribute is generally measured
by income. Suppose, however, that there
exists a commodity that all households must
buy, but it comes at two prices: a low price
reserved to some households and a high price
for all the others. Households that may buy
the commodity at the low price have higher
income available for other goods. Should
capacity to contribute not take that advantage
into account? We believe that it should.1
The commodity we have in mind is of
course housing, which comes at one price as
owner-occupied housing and at another as
rental housing. Owner-occupied housing is
out of reach for many households. If it is a
cheaper arrangement, because housing pro-
duction costs are less for the homeowner
than the landlord, households that can
benefit from it have higher capacity to contri-
bute. We shall call ‘available income’ the
income after housing costs. Tax equity
requires the household to pay the same
amount of taxes in both tenures if available
incomes are equal (horizontal equity) and to
pay more taxes in the tenure that leaves
more available income (vertical equity). One
should add an additional condition: the avail-
able income that is higher before taxes should
not be lower after taxes for that would amount
to a marginal tax rate of more than 100 per
cent on the production cost advantage of the
cheaper tenure.2 A tax system that is equitable
under those conditions leads to after-tax avail-
able incomes that are closer than before taxes.
It may be difficult to accept that taxes
should depend on income reduced by optional
consumption spending (for housing). Indeed,
that approach should not be used to compare
the taxes paid by two households in the
same tenure that decide to spend different
amounts for housing. It is only valid for exam-
ining how taxes discriminate between a renter
and a homeowner when it is the same house-
hold occupying the same dwelling in two
different tenures. This is the narrow sense in
which tax equity is defined here, with focus
on tenure. We shall see that the full set of
taxes pertaining to housing must be included
when testing tax equity between renting and
owning, including the taxes paid by the land-
lord. Again, it is unusual to include taxes com-
prised in consumption goods when assessing
the equity of household income taxation.
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Indeed, one may generally admit that those
taxes are borne by all households equally. That
assumption is wrong in the case of housing.
Only the renter bears the taxes paid by the land-
lord, while the homeowner escapes them.
Of course, we also consider housing taxa-
tion from the point of view of neutrality,
simply defined as the condition that taxes do
not change the ordering of available incomes
between renters and homeowners. In other
words, the tax system is tenure-neutral if the
tenure that leaves a household the highest
available income before taxes still does so
after taxes. This condition shall be called
‘weak tenure neutrality’, as opposed to
‘strong tenure neutrality’, which requires
that the difference in available incomes be
exactly maintained after taxes. Under strong
neutrality, the more advantageous tenure not
only remains so after taxes but it remains so
by exactly the same difference.
Tenure choice is commonly defined as a
comparison of user costs. The homeowner’s
user cost includes actual outlays—interest,
operating costs and taxes—as well as com-
ponents that imply no expenditure—tax
savings, the opportunity cost of equity,
capital gains or losses. The renter’s user cost
essentially corresponds to rent paid, possibly
lowered by personal housing aid. The tax
system affects the renter’s user cost mainly
indirectly, through the rent that reflects the
taxes paid by the landlord. In addition, the
renter pays income tax on the returns on his
financial wealth, which the homeowner
invested in his home. User cost is directly
linked to available income since available
income plus user cost is equal to ordinary
income before housing consumption. Thus,
the difference in user costs between renting
and owning is equal to the difference in avail-
able incomes between owning and renting.
Since available income is the more natural
concept to define tax equity, we shall also
use it for defining tax neutrality.
Income taxes might also affect property
prices, particularly if landowners and develo-
pers can capitalise a part of the tax savings
enjoyed by homeowners. At this first stage,
however, we wish to concentrate on the tax
system in partial equilibrium (as opposed to
a general equilibrium with endogenous
prices and categories of owners and renters).
This is a common and quite acceptable
approach when comparing two assets—
owner-occupied and rental housing—that are
not taxed that differently after all.3
In principle, the effects of taxation on prop-
erty prices could be captured by using prices
and rents observed on the markets for the cal-
culation of user costs or available incomes.
Elsinga (1996), for instance, carefully com-
pared particular rental and owner-occupied
units of the Dutch Randstad, selected to be of
equivalent quality. She interviewed house-
holds about the purchase price of their
housing, which allowed her to set up a sort of
price index, as the owners had bought their
houses at different dates. The change in that
index is a central component in her annual
user cost of owner-occupied housing; so
much so that it dominates the comparison in
user costs. During the first half of the 1980s,
when house prices were stable, the user cost
of owner-occupied housing was higher than
that of rental housing. The strong rise in
house prices during the second half of the
1980s exactly reverses the comparison. The
mortgage interest rate also plays an important
role in the comparison, as it seems to affect
only the user cost of owner-occupied
housing.4 Indeed, a surprising result of Elsin-
ga’s research is that rents do not reflect
changes in interest rates and property prices:
they grow perfectly monotonously in the Neth-
erlands. She thus showed that homeowners are
exposed to considerable risks, risks that land-
lords seem to absorb completely when they
set rents. As a result, homeownership, just
like common stocks, is an asset that can only
be recommended to investors who calculate
their returns over a very long horizon—or
who do not care about true costs.
Elsinga’s research illustrates the volatility
of empirical user costs. It may be more advan-
tageous to own one’s home in a certain year,
when real estate prices grow and interest
rates are low, and less advantageous the next
year, when prices decline and interest rates
rise. In order to obtain a general result on
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the relative costs of owner-occupied housing,
one could compute the user costs over several
years. Still, the date of purchase—peak or
trough—would remain crucial, as well as the
date at which a fixed-rate mortgage (the vast
majority of mortgage credits in the Nether-
lands) was taken up. As a general matter,
annual changes in real estate prices and inter-
est rates may dwarf all other differences
between renting and owning, notably tax
differences.
We wish to develop here a model that
makes it possible to compare tenures in
long-run equilibrium, like for example,
Capone (1995), in order to find evidence of
stable underlying determinants, such as taxa-
tion. Our model describes the average avail-
able incomes, without computing the mean
of annual available incomes. On the side of
the homeowner, it resembles closely the
usual models of user costs, including capital
and operating costs. On the renter’s side,
available income is ordinary income minus
the rent, but that rent is computed to reflect
the landlord’s costs (as in Shelton, 1968; and
Poterba, 1990). We therefore postulate that
the landlord passes those costs on to his
tenant in such a way that he earns his required
return over the whole investment period (and
not necessarily in every individual year).
In order to insulate tax differences from
differences in housing consumption, we
assume that the homeowner and the renter
occupy the same dwelling, which the home-
owner and the landlord buy at the same
price and which appreciates at the same rate
irrespective of who owns it. In other words,
the two dwellings are in the same property
market. Capital gains are taxed at rates that
may differ between owner-occupied and
rental dwellings. The accrual equivalent
capital gains taxes will be included in the
model but we will ignore the fact that property
owners can lower those equivalent tax rates
and sometimes even the statutory capital
gains tax rate by holding their property
longer. Similarly, we ignore taxes that must
be paid once at the time of purchase or sale
and which therefore represent a higher
burden for shorter holding periods. We claim
that such taxes should not be included in the
test of the tenure neutrality of the tax system
because they are designed to discriminate
between shorter and longer holding periods,
not between renting and owning. One could
say that our model is designed to test only
income taxation related to housing.
One fundamental economic difference
between renting and owning we shall allow
for, and it will play an important role: the
difference in costs of producing housing ser-
vices, depending on whether a renter or a
homeowner-occupies the apartment. That
difference may be due to management costs
and faster depreciation for rental housing.
We shall thus focus on differences between
the available incomes of the renter and the
homeowner that are introduced by the tax
system and by ‘production costs’.
3. Available Incomes in the Absence of
Taxes
Our representative household can choose to
rent or to own its dwelling. We assume this
to be the same dwelling to eliminate differ-
ences in quality. When owning its dwelling,
the household invests W, a part of its wealth
that would otherwise earn interest at rate i.
Asterisks mark incomes before taxes. The
household’s other incomes are grouped
under Y. As a tenant, it pays rent R. As a
homeowner, it bears direct production costs
K O encompassing all operating costs (main-
tenance,5 repair, gardening, insurance, electri-
city, water, heating) as well as depreciation
and interest paid on the mortgage. The prop-
erty appreciates by an amount G, which is
added to the homeowner’s available income
under the assumption that he could use this
amount as collateral for borrowing.
As indicated in section 2, tenure tax equity
and neutrality ought to be defined with refer-
ence to ‘available income’, which is equal to
income minus housing costs. If the household
rents its dwelling, its available income is, in
the absence of all taxes
YR
 ¼ Y þ iW  R (1)
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If the same household owns its dwelling, its
available income is
YO
 ¼ Y  KO þ G (2)
When the household chooses to rent its home,
it does so from a landlord. In order to avoid
tainting the comparison of the tax treatment
of owner-occupied with rental housing by
the particular nature of the landlord, we
assume that he is the alter ago of the home-
owner, locating in the same tax brackets and
using the same wealth to purchase the same
dwelling at the same price (presumably the
seller of the dwelling would not know
whether the purchaser buys it for his own
use or for letting) which appreciates by the
same amount.6
Obviously, landlords need not be the same
people as homeowners, tax differences
having the potential to encourage a certain
specialisation. However, in the OECD
country with the largest share of rental
housing, Switzerland, 57.4 per cent of all
rental dwellings belong to individuals (2000
census). Even in that country, rental units
are not the same as owned apartments:
among owner-occupied dwellings, the share
of single-family houses is 57 per cent while
that share is only 5 per cent among rental
dwellings (2000 census). Shelton (1968) saw
the rental and owner-occupied markets as
related though separated. Ten years later,
White and White (1977) emphasised that
rental and owner-occupied housing are substi-
tutes in supply, not only for developers but
also for landlords who have the option to
sell their dwellings to individual households,
possibly the renters themselves.
The landlord’s available income is Y þ
iW if he just keeps his wealth invested in
the reference asset. If he buys rental property,
his available income in the absence of taxes is
YL
 ¼ Y þ R  KL þ G (3)
where KL corresponds to similar direct pro-
duction costs as the homeowner’s KO. The
rental property appreciates by the same
amount G as the owner-occupied property as
it is assumed to be in the same market. The
landlord’s available income is the same
whether he owns rental property or not when
the rent is equal to full production costs CL

CL
 ¼ iW þ KL  G (4)
The landlord earns a normal return if the rent
covers operating and financial costs, including
the required return on equity, minus property
appreciation. Full production costs can be
defined similarly for owner-occupied
housing, as the difference between the home-
owner’s income if he does not own a home
and his available income when he does
CO
 ¼ (Y þ iW)  YO
¼ iW þ KO  G (5)
When the market rent is equal to full pro-
duction costs, the difference in the home-
owner’s and renter’s available incomes
reduces to
YO
  YR ¼ KL  KO (6)
This difference measures the increase in avail-
able income when a household buys its rental
dwelling. It is equal to the difference in direct
production costs K and not full production
costs C because the opportunity cost of
funds and property appreciation are assumed
to be the same for the landlord and the
owner-occupant.
The market rent is equal to costs when com-
petition among landlords is sufficient, which is
an empirical question. Blackley and Follain
(1996) found, with the help of a dynamic
econometric model for the US rental housing
market, that a 10 per cent increase in landlord
costs has rents increase by 6 per cent, but only
after 200 years. After 5 years, real rents are
only 1 per cent higher and 1.7 per cent after
10 years. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992)
had even estimated a smaller impact on
rents, of the order of 0.8 per cent for a 10
per cent shock.
We could salvage our assumption of rents
equal to costs by arguing that, even if it
takes a long time for production cost
changes to translate into changes in rents
and the translation is only partial, rents may
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still best be explained by production costs,
provided they do not change too often. We
could also refer to second-generation rent
control, where rents are not allowed to
exceed costs. Such a defence is not necessary.
Suppose that the landlord’s return R  KL þ
G exceeds iW . In that case, the renter also
invests W in rental housing and his available
income is
YR
 ¼ Y þ (R  KL þ G)  R
¼ Y  KL þ G (7)
Subtracting equation (7) from equation (2)
yields the same difference between the home-
owner’s and the renter’s available incomes as
in equation (6), even when the market rent is
greater than full production costs. To see the
intuition behind this result, consider a situ-
ation where housing shortage allows landlords
to charge rents that exceed their costs and earn
an extraordinary return. The homeowner
escapes the rise in rent that the renter must
bear, but on the other hand he forgoes the
option to earn that extraordinary return, his
wealth being locked in his dwelling. Overall,
he is indifferent from the rise in rents.
Equation (7) is a more general definition of
the renter’s available income than equation
(1) as it also holds when market rents exceed
full production costs.
The difference in available incomes is quite
robust to the investment options assumed for
the household that chooses to rent and to the
relationship between rent and costs. We shall
see that this is still true when taxes are
included and when we compute the difference
in before- and after-tax available incomes of
the renter and homeowner separately.
The difference in available incomes when
owning or renting is equal to the difference
between the financial and other costs incurred
by the landlord in providing housing services
and those directly borne by the homeowner. It
is likely that the landlord’s housing pro-
duction costs are different from the home-
owner’s because they include management
fees (manager, janitor) and because a rented
apartment might wear faster and require
more maintenance. Englund (2003) noted
that the landlord pays management and main-
tenance fees at labour costs that include
payroll taxes whereas the opportunity cost of
the homeowner’s own management and main-
tenance time is the wage rate after income tax.
In some European countries, there is a factor
of two to three between the two labour costs.
Henderson and Ioannides (1983, p. 100) ident-
ified a ‘fundamental rental externality’, corre-
sponding to that part of “marginal costs of
increased breakdowns and wear and tear
caused by increased rates of utilisation” that
cannot be charged to the tenant due to incom-
plete rental contracts. Shilling et al. (1991)
adopted the same principal-agent view. Linne-
man (1985) called the direct costs differential
‘relative landlord production efficiency’, which
can be positive or negative.7 He referred to
superior credit ratings, greater political
influence which yields lower tax assess-
ments, maintenance cost efficiencies, or
economies associated with processing a
landlord’s credit application versus that
for a homeowner (Linneman, 1985, p. 233).
The landlord’s production efficiency is par-
ticularly great in multifamily units, where he
is better able to handle neighbourhood dis-
putes and solve free-rider problems with
respect to the maintenance of common facili-
ties. On the other hand, the landlord’s pro-
duction efficiency is offset by opportunistic
behaviour under the incomplete contract
between landlord and tenant, which requires
expensive monitoring and entails externalised
costs. Linneman did not estimate landlord
production efficiency but he computed critical
values for which renting is financially equally
attractive as owning. For most plausible par-
ameters, those values are less than one,
which corresponds to smaller production effi-
ciency for landlords than for homeowners.
We are not aware of many empirical esti-
mates of the direct costs differential. One
can see why when considering the additional
wear and tear. The ‘normal’ costs in the refer-
ence situation, those of owner-occupied
housing, are indistinguishable from spending
for home improvements. Thus, when Shilling
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et al. (1991) showed that single-family houses
occupied by renters depreciate faster than
those that are occupied by their owner, that
might simply mean that homeowners choose
to spend more on maintenance, not that they
have to. Harding et al. (2000) used similar
data to show that highly indebted homeowners
spend less on maintenance, which might indi-
cate that maintenance spending depends more
on the funds available than on the actual wear
and tear.8 Thus, the data on maintenance
spending and housing depreciation are not
easily informative about underlying wear
and tear. What are needed are data on spend-
ing required to maintain a dwelling at constant
quality. Lacking such data, some authors
simply assume costs for landlords that home-
owners need not bear, such as management
costs.9 For our purpose, it is sufficient that
landlords face different direct costs than
homeowners.
4. Available Incomes with Taxes
The same letters without asterisks now stand
for after-tax incomes, in particular the interest
rate i on equity and other incomes Y. All
income taxes paid by the homeowner in
direct connection with his dwelling, annual-
ised, are grouped in TO. That includes the
accrual-based equivalent of the capital gains
tax that is due upon selling the property. The
renter’s specific housing taxes are grouped
in TR. They are most likely to be negative in
countries where renters are granted an allow-
ance for rents in the definition of taxable
income10 or any form of direct housing
subsidy reserved to rental housing, which
does not imply that renters pay no taxes at
all, only that renting a home lowers their
taxes. The available incomes of the renter
and homeowner with taxes are
YR ¼ Y þ iW  R TR (8)
YO ¼ Y  KO þ G TO (9)
The landlord faces his own set of taxes on
rental housing income, denoted TL. His
alternative investment is the same financial
asset earning after-tax interest i. Hence, he
compares his available income as a landlord
YL ¼ Y þ R KL þ G TL (10)
with the income he earns by holding the reser-
vation asset, Y þ iW . The two are equal when
the rent is equal to full production costs CL
CL ¼ iW þ KL  Gþ TL (11)
Full production costs of rental housing ser-
vices include the after-tax opportunity cost
of funds and the taxes the landlord pays, but
they are lowered by property appreciation.
Similarly, full production costs for owner-
occupied housing CO are the difference
between the homeowner’s after-tax income
if he does not own a home and his available
income when he does
CO ¼ (Y þ iW)  YO
¼ iW þ KO  Gþ TO (12)
When the market rent is equal to the full pro-
duction costs of rental housing services
(R ¼ CL), the difference in available
incomes with taxes is, using equations (8),
(9), and (11)
YO  YR ¼ KL  KO þ TL þ TR
 TO (13)
Thus, the difference between the available
incomes of the homeowner and the renter
depends on the difference in financial and
other costs and taxes incurred in providing
housing services, augmented by the specific
housing taxes of the renter. The taxes paid
by the landlord cannot be ignored when
testing the incidence of the tax system on
tenure choice (i.e. tenure neutrality), as they
affect the renter’s available income. If the
costs of producing housing services are the
same for rental and owner-occupied housing,
the difference in available incomes reduces
to a difference in taxes. Without taxes, the
available incomes differ by the production
costs (equation (6)).
Testing the equity and neutrality of the tax
system will require comparing the taxes paid
by the homeowner with those he would pay
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as a landlord owning the same dwelling. It is
perfectly possible that the production costs
are higher for rental than for owner-occupied
housing services (KL . KO), but that rental
housing is a tax shelter (for example, thanks
to accelerated depreciation allowances), so
that TL , TO. If that tax advantage is passed
on to the renter, he could end up with higher
available income than the homeowner
(Titman, 1982).
We can show rapidly that the difference in
available income is unchanged when the
market rent exceeds full production costs. In
that case, the renter invests his equity W into
rental property where he earns more than
iW. His available income is
YR ¼ Y þ (R KL þ G TL)  R TR
¼ Y  KL þ G TL  TR (14)
Subtract this from the homeowner’s available
income in equation (9) to obtain the same
difference as in equation (13).
5. Equity and Neutrality
Taxation is equitable if it reduces the differ-
ence between available incomes between the
tenures, but not so that the household (or
team) that has higher net income before
taxes ends with lower net income after taxes.
The difference in available incomes before
taxes DY ¼ YO  YL is equal to the differ-
ence in direct production costs DK ¼
KL  KO (equation (6)). From equation (13),
the difference in available incomes after
taxes DY ¼ YO  YL is equal to DK  DT
with
DT ¼ TO  TL  TR (15)
Tenure equity as just defined requires that the
tax system reduce the absolute value of the
difference in available incomes
DK  DTj j , DKj j (16)




, 1 whenDK = 0, andDT ¼ 0
when DK ¼ 0 (17)
Tax neutrality with respect to tenure choice
obtains when taxes do not reverse the sign of
the difference in available incomes between
the homeowner and the renter or, put differ-
ently, when the tenure that yields greater
available income before taxes also yields
greater available income after taxes. This cor-




, 1 when DK = 0, and DT ¼ 0
when DK ¼ 0 (18)
Neutrality allows imposing greater taxes on
the tenure that has lower production costs.
However, the difference in taxes should not
be greater than the difference in those costs.
Contrary to equity, it is perfectly compatible
with neutrality to levy a heavier tax on the
mode of tenure that already has a higher
production cost.
Condition (18) is sufficient for the neu-
trality of housing taxation only to the extent
that the choice of tenure depends on the sign
of the difference in available incomes. We
shall say that taxation is weakly tenure-
neutral when it does not reverse the sign of
the difference in available incomes. It is
quite possible, however, that tenure choice
depends on the very difference in available
incomes—say because there must be a suffi-
cient economic advantage to becoming a
homeowner to justify the sacrifices needed
to accumulate the required equity. To be
strongly tenure-neutral, taxation would have
to leave that difference unchanged. Strong
tenure neutrality requires DT ¼ 0 even when
DK = 0. A tax system that is strongly
tenure-neutral is equitable only in a very
weak sense, as the renter and the homeowner
pay the same amount of taxes even when
their pre-tax available incomes differ.
We have made no distinction between
households. If the available income is
greater in one tenure than in the other, all
households should choose the former. If they
do not, it must be that they are influenced by
factors that are not directly related to available
incomes. Those factors could be gathered in a
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personal minimum difference in available
incomes, Di, that would be required for house-
hold i to choose to own its home rather than
rent it. Thus, household i chooses to own its
home if YO  YR . Di. It rents its home if
the contrary is true. With this approach, neu-
trality should be redefined as requiring that
taxes do not change the sign of
YO  YR  Di—i.e. this expression should
have the same sign as KL  KO  Di. One
would therefore need personalised conditions
for each household. If one wishes to dispense
from that, neutrality must be strong.
Our definition of neutral housing taxation is
not the only possible one. Haffner (2000)
defines tax neutrality as a condition that
owner-occupied housing be taxed like all
other investment goods. That definition
places the household’s choice of how to
invest its savings at the centre of the analysis.
It requires quite naturally full taxation of
implicit rents and taxation of capital gains in
the same way as those on other assets. Our
definition of tax neutrality emphasises the
household’s choice of tenure. We shall see
that full taxation of implicit rents is not
required. We share with Haffner the focus
on taxes and subsidies, leaving out land use
and building code regulation, which also
have an impact of housing costs but do not
discriminate between tenures.
6. A Stylised Tax System
The model elaborated in the previous sections
allows testing the equity and neutrality of
almost any housing income taxation system.
This is illustrated in this section with a stylised
system that is sufficiently flexible to reproduce
the main principles applied in many European
countries. It has elements, such as an imputed
rent, that existed in 9 out of 20 OECD
countries in 1993 (OECD, 1994).11 We also
test a deductible for renters.
The income tax is levied at the locally flat
rate t,12 so that after tax the other income is
Y ¼ (1  t)Y and the income from the reser-
vation financial asset is iW ¼ (1  t)iW . As a
renter, the household may be allowed to
deduct DR from his other income in
connection with his rental contract. It is worth
TR ¼ tDR (19)
The landlord is taxed on imputed rental
income IL (generally but not necessarily the
rent he actually earns), from which he may
deduct direct costs KL and supplementary
deductibles DL such as an allowance for
energy-saving investments, accelerated depre-
ciation or the permission to claim as mainten-
ance some expenditure that in fact increases
the value of the property. In addition, he
owes capital gains taxes when he sells his
property, which we include in the annual
income tax liability by imputing a proportion
(1  eL) of accrued capital gain G. The coeffi-
cient eL is the tax-exempt proportion of
accrued capital gain, corresponding at least
to the advantage of tax deferral. It depends
on the length of the holding period and the
terms of real estate capital gains taxation. A
different coefficient eo may apply to the
homeowner’s capital gain, in particular
when rolling it over through the purchase
of another home allows further deferral.
Altogether, the landlord’s tax liability is
TL ¼ t½IL  KL  DL þ (1  eL)G (20)
Replacing this into equation (11) of full pro-
duction costs and using definition (4) of full
production costs without taxes yields
CL ¼ (1  t)CL þ t(IL  DL  eLG) (21)
If the landlord’s imputed rental income is the
rent he actually earns (IL ¼ R) and that is
equal to full production costs CL, then CL
appears on both sides of equation (21).
Solving for CL yields
CL ¼ CL  t0(DL þ eLG) (22)
with
t0 ¼ t
1  t (23)
If the landlord were taxed on rent earned
minus actual economic costs (DL ¼ 0) and if
capital gains were fully taxed upon accrual
(eL ¼ 0), the income tax would be perfectly
neutral, without any incidence on rents. That
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is a well-known feature of taxes on pure econ-
omic profit. The supplementary deductibles
DL and the tax-exempt part of accrued
capital gains lower taxable rents, which
lowers the tax on rents and so forth—hence
the multiplier-type coefficient for DL in (22).
For the homeowner, an estimated implicit
rental income IO is imputed for tax purposes
for his use of his own dwelling, but he may
deduct the interest paid and expenditures
that maintain the value of the object.13 He
might also be granted supplementary deducti-
bles DO similar to those of the landlord. If,
however, not all of his expenses were deducti-
ble, say because there was a ceiling on interest
deductions, then DO would capture those non-
deductibles and be negative. The homeowner
pays taxes
TO ¼ t½IO  KO  DO þ (1  eO)G (24)
In order to test the tenure neutrality and equity
of the stylised tax system, we need to compute
the tax differential of equation (15) and
compare it with the production cost differen-
tial for owner-occupied and rental housing
services as in conditions (17) and (18). The
following tax differential obtains, using
equations (19), (20) and (24)
DT ¼t½(IO  IL) þ (KL  KO)
þ (DL  DO)  (eO  eL)Gþ DR)
(25)
Thus, the difference in income tax burden
imposed on owner-occupied and rental
housing depends on the difference between
the rental income imputed to the homeowner
and the landlord, on the difference between
the production costs of rental housing and
those of owner-occupied housing (because
they can be deducted), on the difference in
supplementary deductibles, on the difference
in capital gains exemption and on the deducti-
ble granted to the renter.
Next to tenure neutrality and equity, one is
often interested in comparing housing income
(and capital gains) taxation with the taxation
of other goods and assets. That comparison
must be performed for each tenure separately.
We shall consider that housing, rental or
owner-occupied, is a tax shelter if its con-
sumption allows paying less tax than the stat-
utory tax applied to full pre-tax economic
incomes. The tax shelter is computed as this
amount minus effective tax, which is
measured by the difference between available
incomes without and with taxes.14 For the
renter, that will include the possible tax
advantages granted to the landlord, either
because they are passed on to him or
because he can benefit from them by investing
his equity into rental housing. The difference
in the tax shelters of the renter and the home-
owner is equal to the tax differential DT .
The renter’s tax shelter is
SR ¼ t(Y þ iW)  (YR  YR)
¼ R  R TR (26)
The second expression obtains from the defi-
nitions of YR

in equation (1) and of YR in
equation (8), but it could also serve as a defi-
nition of the tax shelter that the renter enjoys
when consuming housing services. When the
rents are equal to the full production costs of
equations (4), (11) and (21) and the renter is
granted the deductible of equation (19), his
tax shelter becomes
SR ¼tiW  TL  TR ¼ t(CL  IL þ DL
þ eLGþ DR) (27)
If, in addition, the landlord’s imputed rental
income is the rent he actually earns
(IL ¼ R), the renter’s tax shelter becomes,
using equation (22)
SR ¼ t0(DL þ eLG) þ tDR (28)
Rental housing is a tax shelter through the
deductible DR granted to the renter and
through the tax advantages granted to the
landlord in the form of supplementary deduc-
tibles and partial exemption of capital gains.
The homeowner’s tax shelter is defined in
the same way as that of the renter
SO ¼ t(Y þ iW)  (YO  YO)
¼ CO  CO (29)
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where, CO

and CO are the full production
costs of owner-occupied housing without
and with taxes of equations (5) and (12).
Replacing those definitions into equation
(29) and using equation (24) yields this tax
shelter for the homeowner under the stylised
tax system
SO ¼ tiW  TO
¼ t(CO  IO þ DO þ eOG) (30)
The first equality in (30) is how Laidler (1969,
table 1), computes tax subsidies to home-
owners. Owner-occupied housing is a tax
shelter through the difference between its
full production costs and imputed rent and
through the supplementary deductibles and
partial exemption of capital gains.
7. Solutions for Tenure-neutral and
Equitable Housing Taxation
For ease of interpretation and without loss of
generality, we shall assume from now on that
direct costs are higher for rental housing
(KL . KO, so DK . 0, an assumption for
which arguments were given at the end of
section 3. That implies that owner-occupied
housing is the cheaper solution in the absence
of all taxes. A tax system that is equitable and
weakly neutral with respect to tenure choice
reduces that cost advantage. A tax system that
is strongly neutral leaves it unchanged. The
tax system narrows the difference in available
incomes if the tax differential of equation (25)
is positive. That is the case when
IO . IL  (KL  KO) þ (DO  DL
 DR) þ (eO  eL)G (31)
Tenure-equitable and tenure-neutral housing
income taxation imposes a floor on the home-
owner’s imputed rent IO, which is equal to
the landlord’s imputed rental income (which
is generally the actual rent) minus the cost
differential because the landlord can deduct
greater costs KL. That floor is raised if the
homeowner is granted more generous
additional deductibles and greater exemption
of his capital gain.
More precise conditions for equity and neu-
trality can be found by aiming at a tax differential
that lowers the difference in available income
exactly in proportion t of the income tax:
DT ¼ tDK. We shall call this ‘strongly equi-
table’. Using equation (25), this is equivalent to
IO  DO  eOG ¼ IL  DL  eLG
 DR (32)
Several feasible tax solutions satisfy sufficient
condition (32) for equity and weak tenure neu-
trality. By making the two tenures pay differ-
ent amounts of taxes for the same housing
consumption (unless production costs are
equal: KL ¼ KO), the solutions narrow the
advantage of the cheaper tenure in proportion
to the difference in production costs. If
capital gains are not taxed in the same way
for owner-occupied and rental housing
(eO = eL), that has to be picked up by the
homeowner’s imputed rent or additional
deductibles (see equation (32)), which is
clearly not practical. Hence, all the tax sol-
utions presented here have eO ¼ eL. Four prac-
tical tax solutions are proposed that lower the
homeowner’s available income advantage in
proportion t. They are represented in Table 1
with their resulting tax shelters/tax burdens.
Recall that the ratio DT=DK is decisive for
tax neutrality and equity. As indicated in
equations (17) and (18), a tax solution is equi-
table when that ratio is between 0 and 1. It is
weakly tenure-neutral when it is less than 1
and strongly tenure-neutral when it is equal
to 0.
The four practical tax solutions that lower
the homeowner’s available income advantage
in proportion t are
(a) Equal imputed rental income, supplemen-
tary deductibles and capital gains taxation
for homeowner and landlord; no deductible
for renter (IO ¼ IL ¼ I, DO ¼ DL ¼ D,
eO ¼ eL ¼ e, DR ¼ 0).
It is plausible to grant the same supplemen-
tary deductibles to the homeowner as to the
landlord as they are both taxed on the same
imputed rental income, but the landlord will
pay less tax because he has higher production
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housing Taxes paid Equity and neutrality
(a) Equal imputed rental income,
supplementary deductibles and
capital gains taxation for
homeowner and landlord; no
deductible for renter
t(CL  I þ Dþ eG) t(CO  I þ Dþ eG) DT ¼ tDK Strongly equitable
Weakly neutral
(b) Equal imputed rental income,
supplementary deductibles and
capital gains taxation for
homeowner and landlord; imputed
rental income is equal to market
rent; no deductible for renter
t0(Dþ eG) t0(Dþ eG)  tDK DT ¼ tDK Strongly equitable
Weakly neutral
(c) Same imputed rental income for
homeowner and landlord, equal to
market rent; no supplementary
deductible for anyone and full
capital gains taxation upon accrual
0 tDK DT ¼ tDK Strongly equitable
Weakly neutral
(d) No imputed rent for homeowner
and renter may deduct his
landlord’s imputed rent from his
own taxable income; equal
supplementary deductibles and
capital gains taxation for
homeowner and landlord
t(C L þDþ eG) t(C O þDþ eG) DT ¼ tDK Strongly equitable
Weakly neutral
(e) Owner-occupied housing treated
as a consumption good: no
imputed rental income, no
deduction and full capital gains
exemption for homeowner





































housing Taxes paid Equity and neutrality
(f) No imputed rental income, no
deduction and full capital gains
exemption for homeowner; the
renter may deduct his landlord’s
taxable income from his own
taxable income
tiW tiW TO ¼ TL þ TR ¼ 0 Very weakly equitable
Strongly neutral
(g) No imputed rental income, no
deduction and full capital gains
exemption for homeowner; no
supplementary deductible and full
capital gains taxation upon
accrual for landlord; the renter’s
return on his equity is tax-exempt
tiW tiW TO ¼ TL þ TR ¼ 0 Very weakly equitable
Strongly neutral
(h) Equal imputed rental income,
supplementary deductibles and
capital gains taxation for
homeowner and landlord; the
direct cost differential between
rental and owner-occupied
housing is added to renter’s
taxable income



















(i) Equal imputed rental income, sum
of ordinary and supplementary
deductibles, and capital gains
taxation for homeowner and
landlord; no deductible for renter
t(CO  I þ DO þ eG) t(CO  I þ DO þ eG) TO ¼ TL þ TR Very weakly equitable
Strongly neutral
(j) Same imputed rental income for
homeowner and landlord, equal to
market rent, and full capital gains
taxation upon accrual; no
supplementary deductible for
landlord; supplementary
deductible for homeowner equal
to the direct cost differential with
rental housing
0 0 TO ¼ TL ¼ tiW , TR ¼ 0 Very weakly equitable
Strongly neutral
(k) Equal net imputed rental income
for homeowner and landlord,
equal to the reservation return on
equity; no deductible for anyone
nor any capital gains taxation
0 0 TO ¼ TL ¼ tiW , TR ¼ 0 Very weakly equitable
Strongly neutral
Notes: C is full production costs of housing services, including the opportunity cost of funds and capital gains; K is direct production costs with DK ¼ KL  KO; t is the (locally) pro-
portional income tax rate; I is imputed rental income; D gathers supplementary deductibles; e is the tax-exempt portion of accrued capital gains G; and T is the sum of taxes levied in
relation to housing with DT ¼ TO  TL  TR. Asterisks denote pre-tax amounts and the superscripts L, O and R distinguish the variables for the landlord, the homeowner and the
renter when necessary. A tax system is strongly equitable when it reduces the cost advantage of the cheaper tenure in proportion t of the cost advantage and very weakly equitable
when it imposes the same taxes on both tenures. It is weakly neutral when the taxes imposed on the cheaper tenure do not make it more expensive and strongly neutral when it






























costs to deduct. Under this solution, the tax shel-
ters for rental and owner-occupied housing are
respectively SR ¼ t(CL  I þ Dþ eG) and
SO ¼ t(CO  I þ Dþ eG). Housing is a tax
shelter to the extent that imputed incomes are
less than pre-tax total production costs and
that supplementary deductibles and partial
capital gains exemption are granted.
(b) Equal imputed rental income, supplemen-
tary deductibles and capital gains taxation for
homeowner and landlord; imputed rental
income is equal to market rent; no deductible
for renter (IO ¼ IL ¼ R, DO ¼ DL ¼ D,
eO ¼ eL ¼ e, DR ¼ 0).
This solution is a particular case of (a) for
which the tax shelters reduce to SR ¼
t0(Dþ eG) (equation (28)) and SO ¼
SR  t(KL  KO) when the rent is equal to
full production costs of rental housing. The
renter benefits from the tax breaks granted to
the landlord but the homeowner gets them
too, directly and through a smaller imputed
rent. However, the homeowner benefits from
a smaller tax shelter than the renter because
he is imputed a rental income based on the
landlord’s direct production costs KL but
may deduct only his smaller costs KO.
(c) Same imputed rental income for home-
owner and landlord, equal to market rent; no
supplementary deductible for anyone and
full capital gains taxation upon accrual
(IO ¼ IL ¼ R, DO ¼ DL ¼ 0, eO ¼ eL ¼ 0,
DR ¼ 0).
This solution is a particular case of (b) that has
no tax shelter anymore for the renter and a nega-
tive tax shelter SO ¼ t(KL  KO) for the
homeowner due to the fact that he is imputed a
rental income based on the landlord’s pro-
duction costs KL but may deduct only his
smaller costs KO. Since all and only economic
costs are deductible, this solution has no
impact on rents. It taxes the pure profit of the
landlord, so that his return on equity is reduced
just as if he had invested that equity in the reser-
vation asset. However, this solution lowers the
homeowner’s available income in proportion
to the difference between operating a rental
and an owner-occupied dwelling. Thus, it
reduces the available income differential
between owner-occupied and rental housing
by making the former less attractive.
(d) No imputed rent for homeowner and renter
may deduct his landlord’s imputed rent from
his own taxable income; equal supplementary
deductibles and capital gains taxation for
homeowner and landlord (IO ¼ 0,
DO ¼ DL ¼ D, eO ¼ eL ¼ e, DR ¼ IL).
If the tax authority does not wish to impute
to the homeowner the market rent as implicit
income but allows him to deduct all operating
and interest costs KO, then equity and weak
tenure neutrality can still be obtained by
letting the renter deduct from his own
taxable income the rental income that is
imputed to his landlord. This is typically the
rent he pays, in which case the solution
obtains that Vickrey (1972) had proposed in
despair over the political feasibility of full
homeowner income taxation—to let the
renter deduct his rent from his taxable
income. This solution creates tax shelters
SR ¼ t(CL þ Dþ eG) and SO ¼ t(CO þ
Dþ eG) of which the main components are
the exempted explicit or implicit rentals
valued at full production costs.15 The
renter’s tax shelter is a little more generous
because he may deduct a rent including
higher production costs than the tax-exempt
implicit rent of the homeowner. Those tax
shelters do not disappear even when the home-
owner and the landlord are not granted any
supplementary deductibles and capital gains
are fully taxed upon accrual.
It is not necessary that the tax system
reduce the difference in available incomes in
the proportion of the statutory tax rate t to
be equitable or weakly tenure-neutral. Many
more conditions can be found for the stylised
tax system, but they may be much more diffi-
cult to implement if they need complicated
calculation of the imputed rent and personal-
ised conditions.
One solution frequently advocated and
applied in some countries such as Australia
is to treat owner-occupied housing as a
regular consumption good. In our model for-
mulation, this corresponds to TO ¼ 0 in
equation (24), which can be thus obtained.
290 PHILIPPE THALMANN
(e) No imputed rental income, no deduction
and full capital gains exemption for home-
owner (IO ¼ 0, DO ¼ KO, eO ¼ 1).
Since the homeowner pays no housing-
related income taxes, this solution is weakly
neutral when rental housing is positively
taxed, simply because it makes owner-occu-
pied housing even more advantageous. That
would not be equitable, however. For tenure
equity, rental housing must be subsidised
overall (TL þ TR , 0), but not so that the sub-
sidies more than compensate the cost advan-
tage of owner-occupied housing
(TL  TR , DK). The renter enjoys the
generic tax shelter of equation (27) and the
homeowner gets SO ¼ tiW or the amount of
the statutory tax on the implicit return on his
equity. Indeed, not including housing at all
in the taxation of the homeowner’s income
amounts to exempting the implicit return on
his equity or, equivalently, to allow invest-
ment in a tax-free good but only for home-
owners (Bourassa and Hendershott, 1994).
As DK might be small, there is a risk that
subsidies to rental housing more than compen-
sate the cost advantage of owner-occupied
housing. So if rental housing is also to be
tax-favoured, the safest way is to let it also
enjoy income tax exemption, by exempting
the landlord from income taxation just like
the homeowner and to not grant the renter
any deductible related to his housing con-
sumption (TL ¼ TR ¼ 0). In fact, rental
housing tax exemption (TL þ TR ¼ 0) can
even be obtained when the landlord is taxed
regularly on earned rent minus costs, provided
the renter is allowed to deduct from his own
taxable income his landlord’s taxable income.
(f) No imputed rental income, no deduction
and full capital gains exemption for home-
owner; the renter may deduct his landlord’s
taxable income from his own taxable income
(IO ¼ 0, DO ¼ KO, eO ¼ 1, DR ¼
IL  KL  DLþ (1  eL)G).
The renter should not be allowed to deduct
his full rent from his taxable income but only
the portion of his rent on which the landlord
is taxed. With this tax solution, the tax shelters
for rental and owner-occupied housing are
equal: SR ¼ SO ¼ tiW . Of course, this sol-
ution is more practical when the landlord is
also fully exempted from capital gains taxation
and there would still remain an apportionment
problem of the landlord’s taxable income when
he owns more than one rental dwelling.
Once it is recognised that treating owner-
occupied housing like a pure consumption
good allows homeowners to shelter equity,
compensation can be sought in letting the
renter shelter the same amount of equity, as
proposed by Hendershott and Hu (1980). In
the terms of the present model.
(g) No imputed rental income, no deduction
and full capital gains exemption for home-
owner; no supplementary deductible and
full capital gains taxation upon accrual for
landlord; the renter’s return on his equity
is tax exempt (IO ¼ 0, DO ¼ KO, eO ¼ 1,
IL ¼ R, DL ¼ eL ¼ 0, DR ¼ iW).
The landlord is taxed on his pure profit
(TL ¼ tiW) and the rent is equal to pro-
duction costs without taxes (R ¼ CL). The
tax shelter for rental housing is directly
earned by the renter, nothing being passed to
him through his rent. It corresponds to the
tax the renter would normally have to pay
on his financial return (SR ¼ tiW) and is
equal to the homeowner’s tax shelter provided
the renter’s equity is the same as the equity
invested by the homeowner in his property.
Again, TO ¼ TL þ TR ¼ 0.
Those solutions that exempt both rental and
owner-occupied housing from income taxa-
tion are obviously strongly neutral and
weakly equitable. They are not neutral with
respect to portfolio allocation and housing
financing (nor is solution (e)), since offering
a tax shelter to equity tilts the playing-field
against debt.16
In general, the tax system is strongly
tenure-neutral if TO ¼ TL þ TR, even when
those taxes are different from 0. For the sty-
lised tax system (equation (25)), that con-
dition is equivalent to
IO  KO  DO  eOG
¼ IL  KL  DL  eLG DR (33)
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Equation (33) shows that strong tenure neu-
trality is not obtained by simply imputing for
the homeowner an income equal to the market
rent (IO ¼ R), even when the landlord’s
imputed rental income is the rent he earns
(IL ¼ R). It is necessary to take into consider-
ation the difference in production costs if the
tax system is to preserve that difference.
Strong tenure neutrality could be obtained by
offering the renter a compensating deductible
equal to the differential in costs and taxes
between the homeowner and the landlord.
This become practically feasible when those
differentials are reduced to the minimum—i.e.
when the homeowner is taxed as much as poss-
ible like the landlord. Here are two proposals.
(h) Equal imputed rental income, supplemen-
tary deductibles and capital gains taxation for
homeowner and landlord; the direct cost differ-
ential between rental and owner-occupied
housing is added to renter’s taxable income
(IO ¼ IL ¼ I, DO ¼ DL ¼ D, eO ¼ eL ¼ e,
DR ¼ KO  KL)
The extra direct costs of rental housing
must be added to the renter’s taxable income
(DR , 0) because the landlord may deduct
more costs from his taxable income than the
homeowner. The reason for this becomes
clear when the imputed rental income for
both landlord and homeowner is equal to the
market rent, because that overassesses the
homeowner’s income relative to his own
lower direct production costs. Rental housing
enjoys the same generic tax shelter of equation
(30) as owner-occupied housing. This tax solu-
tion is weakly equitable and strongly neutral. It
resembles solution (a), which was strongly
equitable and weakly neutral by not imputing
any additional taxable income to the renter.
Obviously, solution (h) is not likely to be
very popular with renters.
(i) Equal imputed rental income, sum
of ordinary and supplementary deductibles,
and capital gains taxation for homeowner
and landlord; no deductible for renter
(IO ¼ IL ¼ I, DO þ KO ¼ DL þ KL, eO ¼
eL ¼ e, DR ¼ 0).
In this case, the overassessment of the home-
owner’s housing income is offset by greater
supplementary deductibles by the amount of
the difference between the direct production
costs of rental and owner-occupied housing.
Rental housing enjoys the same generic tax
shelter of equation (30) as owner-occupied
housing. The difference with solution (h) is that
the supplementary deductibles granted to the
landlord and the homeowner are not the same.
Further solutions for strongly tenure-neutral
taxation can be obtained by seeking a common
value for the tax burden imposed on owner-
occupied and rental housing, particularly
when that common value is equal to the statu-
tory tax on the implicit return on equity tiW.
In that case, both tax shelters are reduced to
zero and full neutrality obtains as defined by
Haffner (2000)—that is, also with respect to
non-housing investment. Again, many sol-
utions are possible to obtain SR ¼ t(iW þ
KL  IL þ DL þ eLGþ DR) ¼ 0 and a similar
expression for the homeowner. Two relatively
practical ones are proposed here
(j) Same imputed rental income for homeowner
and landlord, equal to market rent, and full
capital gains taxation upon accrual; no sup-
plementary deductible for landlord; sup-
plementary deductible for homeowner equal
to the direct cost differential with rental
housing (IO ¼ IL ¼ R, DO ¼ KL  KO,
DL ¼ 0, eO ¼ eL ¼ 0, DR ¼ 0).
This solution is very similar to solution (c)
but eliminates the homeowner’s negative tax
shelter by allowing him supplementary deduc-
tibles that offset the fact that he is imputed a
rental income based on the landlord’s pro-
duction costs KL but may deduct only his
smaller costs KO. Alternatively, one could
grant no supplementary deductible to the
homeowner (DO ¼ 0) and impute rental
income equal to the full pre-tax production
costs of owner-occupied housing (IO ¼ CO).
(k) Equal net imputed rental income for
homeowner and landlord, equal to the
reservation return on equity; no deductible
for anyone nor any capital gains taxation
(IO ¼ IL ¼ iW , DO ¼ KO, DL ¼ KL,
eO ¼ eL ¼ 1, DR ¼ 0).
This solution was proposed by Vickrey
(1947). It avoids the need for full capital
292 PHILIPPE THALMANN
gains taxation upon accrual and still elimin-
ates tax shelters. Both landlord and home-
owner pay taxes tiW for their housing
investment. The same results can be obtained
by counting a return not on equity but on the
property’s value as housing income for the
landlord and the homeowner and letting
them deduct mortgage interest and nothing
else related to housing. That is the ‘property
tax’ proposal of Englund (2003). A third
variant estimates the landlord’s and home-
owner’s housing income at full production
costs, including the opportunity cost of
equity (IL ¼ KL þ iW , IO ¼ KO þ iW),
and allows them to deduct housing-related
expenses including mortgage interest.
Obviously, this is a less practical solution.
In 2000, Denmark replaced the imputed rent
it had added to other capital income since 1903
by a ‘property value tax’ of 1 per cent of the
publicly assessed property value. This can be
seen as a 16.7 per cent flat tax on 6 per cent
return or a 12.5 per cent flat tax on 8 per cent
return if the property is fully equity owned
(Lunde, 2004). This Danish solution resembles
Englund’s ‘property tax’ proposal. It is not
equivalent, though, if that implicit property
income is not adjusted every year to reflect
current market returns for assets of equivalent
risk and liquidity.
Defining the homeowner’s taxable income
from his housing as equal to the implicit
return on the locked-in equity or as a general
return on the asset value, instead of computing
an implicit rent and allowing him to deduct
costs, is an attractive solution for countries
that, unlike Switzerland, have only small or
heavily regulated rental markets, as suggested
by Hughes (1980). It should not be harder to
implement than an imputed rental income,
particularly when properties are regularly
assessed anyway.
8. Conclusions
In the case of housing, testing the equity and
the tenure neutrality of the tax system cannot
be limited to comparing the taxes paid by
the renter and the homeowner. It is necessary
also to include the taxes paid by the landlord,
as the renter is the only ‘consumer’ to bear
those taxes, through higher rent.17 It is
equally necessary to take into consideration
the costs borne by the homeowner in compari-
son with those of the renter and especially the
landlord. The homeowner can typically
‘produce’ housing services at a lower cost
than can the landlord: smaller management
costs, maintenance costs, no loss of rental
income. Those cost advantages compound
the tax advantages when the implicit rental
income is imputed very conservatively to
render ownership quite attractive, provided
that the landlord and the homeowner purchase
the same dwelling at the same price and obtain
the same credit terms. A premium for retail
sales of dwellings—typically for condomi-
niums—and difficulties with financing the
purchase can easily wipe out the other econ-
omic advantages of homeownership. Shorter
holding periods that force homeowners to
incur high transaction costs more frequently
are also an argument against ownership.
Tenure neutrality and equity do not always
accord. For the tax system to be neutral with
respect to tenure choice, that tenure which is
more advantageous should remain so after
taxes. For strong tenure neutrality, the financial
advantage should even be preserved exactly.
Equity, for its part, requires that those who
benefit from cheaper tenure pay more tax,
even if part of the advantage is thereby taken
away. If households choose the tenure that
implies higher available income, whatever the
size of the gain, then an equitable tax system
is also neutral. Obviously, financial advantage
is but one aspect of tenure choice. A reduced
available income advantage lowers the weight
of that element of choice and the scale may
tip for some households. In that case, the equi-
table tax system is not tenure-neutral.
Four feasible tax solutions were shown that
reduce the homeowner’s cost advantage in the
proportion of the income tax, which we there-
fore called strongly equitable. Three of them
impute the same rental income to the home-
owner as to the landlord and grant them the
same supplementary deductibles and partial
capital gains exemption. That reduces the
cost advantage of the homeowner because he
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may deduct only his smaller direct production
costs for an imputed rent based on the land-
lord’s higher costs. The fourth strongly equi-
table solution has no imputed rental income
for the homeowner but the renter is allowed
to deduct his rent from his taxable income.
All those solutions yield tax shelters for
owner-occupied and rental housing related to
the supplementary deductibles and partial
capital gains exemption. With the fourth sol-
ution, the tax shelter is markedly increased
by the exemption of rental income.
We also showed that leaving owner-
occupied housing fully out of income taxation
(no imputed rental income or capital gains
taxation and no deductibles) allows the home-
owner a tax shelter equal to the amount of the
statutory tax on the implicit return on his
equity. That solution is not equitable but it is
weakly neutral in making the cheaper tenure
even more attractive (unless favourable tax
treatment of rental housing offsets its cost dis-
advantage). Of course, rental housing could
also be exempted from income taxation, in
which case income taxation would be strongly
tenure-neutral. That would grant rental
housing the same tax-sheltered return on
equity as owner-occupied housing. Such a sol-
ution could even be obtained with regular
income taxation of the landlord, provided
the renter were allowed to deduct his land-
lord’s taxable income related to his dwelling
(rent minus deductible costs, not the full
rent) from his own taxable income. If the land-
lord were taxed on pure profit (no supplemen-
tary deductibles and full capital gains taxation
upon accrual), that solution could also be
obtained by exempting the renter’s financial
return on his wealth, provided that it were
the same as the equity sheltered in his property
by the homeowner.
Many solutions can be imagined that
impose the same taxes on owner-occupied
and rental housing and thus achieve strong
tenure neutrality, but only very weak equity.
We proposed four, two of which simply
equate the taxes on owner-occupied and
rental housing at any value and two that set
those taxes at the level of the statutory tax
on the implicit return on equity and thus
eliminate all tax shelters for owner-occupied
and rental housing. The first two tax solutions
impute the same rental income for the home-
owner and the landlord (not necessarily the
market rent) and grant them the same partial
exemption of capital gains. One of those sol-
utions has the same supplementary deducti-
bles for homeowner and landlord, which
implies a tax disadvantage for the home-
owner, which must be offset by adding the
direct cost differential between rental and
owner-occupied housing to the renter’s
income. The other tax solution has no imputa-
tion for the renter but an extra deductible for
the homeowner equal to that cost differential.
The two tax solutions that eliminate all tax
shelters do so in very different ways. The
first one imputes the market rent as income
to the homeowner and landlord, taxes capital
gains fully upon accrual, allows the landlord
to deduct only actual costs but grants the
homeowner a supplementary deductible
equal to the cost differential. That is designed
to offset the overestimation of his implicit
rental income that is based on the production
cost of rental housing. The second solution
has no capital gains taxation and no deducti-
bles at all but imputes to the homeowner and
landlord housing income equal to the implicit
return on equity.
Clearly, tax shelters are only eliminated in
very weakly equitable tax solutions, which
impose the same taxes on owner-occupied
and rental housing even when one tenure
enjoys a production cost advantage. There is,
therefore, a trade-off between equity and the
undesirable secondary effects of tax shelters,
such as inefficient investment in housing and
distortions in maintenance and financing.
Finally, the practical feasibility, in particular
as regards the assessment of accrued capital
gains and implicit rental income, and the con-
sequences for public budgets ought to be con-
sidered when comparing tax solutions.
Notes
1. A mitigating argument could be that the
renter earns income in cash on his equity
whereas “investment in an owner-occupied
house has the peculiarity that the whole
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return must be currently consumed” (Goode,
1960, p. 512). That difference matters when
the implicit rent exceeds what a household
would spend for its housing in a frictionless
world, which concerns particulary the
elderly.
2. This is not so much a condition of equity as a
condition of feasibility: no one would make
the efforts required to earn higher income
to end up with lower income after taxes.
3. In addition, Bruce and Holtz-Eakin (1999)
have shown that even fundamental reforms
of housing taxation have little impact on
house prices once the adjustments in con-
sumption and investment are taken into
account.
4. Location has no great effect for its part. Indeed,
the evolution of prices is rather uniform over
the different parts of the Randstad.
5. Spending for maintenance is assumed suffi-
cient to prevent physical depreciation.
6. These assumptions are similar to those of
Giertz and Sullivan (1978) who compare a
homeowner with an identical tenant who
invests his equity in rental housing rented
to a third party.
7. Megbolugbe and Linneman (1993) use the
more general term ‘managerial efficiency’.
8. Harding et al. (2000) actually develop a
different explanation for that result. They
believe that highly indebted homeowners
consider the option to default, in which
case maintenance spending is of no advan-
tage to them. They even develop a further
idea in response to Shilling et al. (1991)
that homeowners do not bear the full conse-
quences of poor care and maintenance, just
like the renters, because future buyers also
fail to measure all damages. This is not con-
firmed by their data.
9. Capone (1995) sets these costs at 2 per cent
of house value before tax for his simulations.
10. Such allowances exist in 4 Swiss cantons out
of 26, with the purpose of setting tenants on
a more equal footing with homeowners. In
one canton, all taxpayers are allowed to
deduct from their taxable income that part
of their annual rent (or imputed rent) that
exceeds 20 per cent of their net income,
with a ceiling. Since imputed rents are set
rather conservatively, it is essentially
tenants who benefit from that allowance. In
two cantons, tenants may deduct 20 per
cent of their rent with a ceiling. In one
canton, tenants are allowed a fixed amount.
11. The other countries do not allow unlimited
deductibility of mortgage interest paid.
12. Flat rates have been found repeatedly to be
good approximations of effective tax
schedules when deductions are taken into
account (for Switzerland, see Mottu, 1997).
Here, it is sufficient that the marginal tax
rate be the same for the landlord, renter
and homeowner, who are supposed to
enjoy the same non-housing incomes and
wealth.
13. The UK used estimated rents for tax pur-
poses from the beginning of income tax in
1803 until 1963. Schedule A, the tax levied
on income from land and buildings, taxed
the imputed income of homeowners. In the
years before abolition, the tax progressively
lost its ‘bite’ as rent estimations lagged
inflation while deductions were allowed on
current terms. Abolition implied small
revenue losses (Cullingworth, 1979).
14. This tax shelter definition exactly corre-
sponds to the difference in user costs
before and after taxes.
15. In the US, tenants were allowed to deduct
annual rental payments on their residences
under the Civil War income tax (Goode,
1960). Goode wrote: “The Civil War tax
appears to have resulted in much more
nearly equal treatment of renters and
owner-occupants than has been achieved in
moder income tax law” (p. 523). However,
he continues, “allowance of a deduction for
rent . . . cannot be recommended in view of
its revenue cost and the favouritism it
would show to housing compared with
other forms of consumption”.
16. It might appear from Table 1 that the tax
shelters depend on the amount of equity W
under solution (d) too, since the full costs
C include iW, but they also include direct
costs K, which include the cost of debt
i(PW), where P would be the value of
the property. Thus, the term in W washes
out unless interest rates on debt and equity
are different.
17. The rent could actually be lower than pro-
duction costs, if rental housing is a tax
shelter.
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